Abstract: Youth curfew ordinances are a widely touted, yet little studied, policy tool available to local police departments. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of curfew ordinances by comparing the arrest behavior of various age-groups within a city before and after curfew enactment. The evidence suggests that curfews are effective at reducing both violent and property crimes committed by juveniles below the statutory curfew age. Arrests of adults and youth above the curfew age also appear to decrease in the wake of curfew enactment, however these effects are smaller and statistically insignificant.
"[Youth curfews] help keep our children out of harm's way. They give parents a tool to impart discipline, respect, and rules at an awkward and di¢ cult time in children's lives." -Bill Clinton (1996) "Can you tell the di¤erence between a 19-year-old (who may be exempt from a curfew) and a 17-year-old (who may not be)? A law that gives the police the right -indeed, requires them -to stop people on the basis of their perceived age is an invitation to trouble." -Geo¤rey Canada (1996), president of Rheedlen Centers for Children and Families
Youth curfews have become a popular tool for combating juvenile delinquency. A survey by Rue ‡e and Reynolds (1996a) found that 146 of the 200 American cities with population above 100,000 had curfew laws on the books, with 110 having enacted or revised their ordinances between 1990 and 1995. A subsequent study by the U.S.
Conference of Mayors (1997) found that 80% of the 347 cities with population over 30,000 had youth curfews.
Despite their popularity with local governments, existing studies …nd little evidence to support the notion that curfews are e¤ective at reducing crime (Males and Macallair, 1999; McDowell et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2000) . 1 This paper reassesses this conclusion, extending the literature by combining newly collected data on local ordinances with an event study research design comparing the arrest behavior of various age-groups within a city before and after curfew enactment. A key contribution is the separate assessment of the impact of curfew ordinances, which normally only 1 apply to youth under the age of 16 or 17, on arrests of youth subject to the curfew law and those above the city's statutory maximum curfew age.
Analyzing both sets of impacts is important because curfew policies can be thought of as constituting two treatments, each applying to a di¤erent set of agegroups. The …rst treatment, the statutory treatment, is that of being subject to a curfew citation, …ne, temporary detention, or whatever punishment is statutorily prescribed for curfew violations by minors. This treatment only a¤ects those youth under the statutory curfew age. The second treatment, the statistical discrimination treatment, is that of being subject to lower standards of probable cause as a result of one's perceived youth. Police are unlikely to be able to distinguish ex-ante between young people just above and below the curfew age. Thus, for adjacent age-groups curfews should raise the probability of being stopped or searched by an amount that depends very little on one's actual age. The possibility of this second e¤ect is frequently cited by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) as an argument for reversing such ordinances on the grounds that they constitute violations of fundamental civil liberties.
Constitutional issues aside, both treatments should be of interest to economists.
The statutory treatment represents the deterrent e¤ect of the curfew's statutory sanctions. Identifying this e¤ect tells us how much crime could be reduced by raising penalties or increasing enforcement of curfew ordinances. 2 It also implicitly provides an estimate of an important margin in the economics of crime: the substitutability of criminal activity across time. 3 Indeed, if, as in basic economic models (Becker, 1968) , crime is a purposive activity, then curfews should only reduce delinquency if the technology used to produce this behavior is imperfectly substitutable between curfew and non-curfew hours.
The statistical discrimination treatment tells us the impact of weakening Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Estimates of this margin are important not only for those interested in evaluating the costs and bene…ts of the age discrimination implicit in youth curfews, but those involved in recent debates over racial pro…ling and national security. Furthermore, these estimates are closely tied to the elasticity of criminal behavior with respect to the probability of detection, a key parameter in Becker's classic model.
Under the assumption that police cannot distinguish between adjacent ages exante, comparisons of the response of age-groups just below the curfew age to those just above will estimate the statutory treatment e¤ect. Similarly, statistical discrimination e¤ects can be estimated by comparing the response of age-groups just above the curfew age to those several years older. The presence of non-trivial statutory or statistical discrimination e¤ects may also induce a second order e¤ect on the crime rates of adults due to cross-age interactions. These e¤ects on adults may be identi…ed provided curfew laws are not enacted in response to trends in adult crime, a condition which appears to be satis…ed in the data.
To preview the results, I …nd strong evidence of persistent statutory treatment e¤ects on criminal behavior. Arrests for Part I o¤enses appear to fall by around 10%
in the three years following curfew enactment. Though the results are imprecise, there do appear to be spillover e¤ects on young adults and adults over age 25, 3 with both groups exhibiting roughly equivalent declines in arrests in response to enactment. Hence, the data are less supportive of statistical discrimination e¤ects than the hypothesis that criminal propensity is positively dependent across agegroups.
Section II provides background on curfew legislation, Section III describes the econometric methodology, Section IV describes the data, Section V provides results, Section VI concludes.
II A Brief Introduction to Youth Curfew Laws
Juvenile curfews are local ordinances proscribing minors, generally within a speci…ed age range, from occupying public areas and streets during particular times. These policies are not new. The …rst youth curfew was enacted in Omaha, Nebraska in 1880 (Hemmens and Bennett, 1999) . In 1884, President Harrison gave a speech endorsing curfews as "the most important municipal regulation for the protection of the children of American homes, from the vices of the street" (Note, 1958) . By 1957, 57 of the 109 cities with 1950 population over 100,000 reported having curfews (Note, 1958 
The Dallas Model
Although the speci…cs of curfew implementation vary by city, it is worth delving into the details of the Dallas program so that we might understand the issues involved.
The Dallas curfew applied to all youth under the age of 17 and proscribed them from being in public places during the hours of 11 pm -6 a.m. on weekdays and 12 a.m. -6 a.m. on weekends. Before the curfew was implemented on May 1, 1994, the Dallas Police Department put out public service announcements in English and Spanish on the radio and in poster form to announce that the ordinance would soon be enforced. They also held a well covered press conference explaining details of the law. Furthermore, a week before the curfew was implemented police handed out warning ‡iers to youth in public during curfew hours.
Once the curfew actually went into e¤ect, police had substantial discretion over 6 how they would implement the ordinance. Police could give youths in violation of the curfew a verbal warning, take them home, issue a ticket with a …ne as high as $500, or take them into custody. A youth detention facility was sta¤ed by the city for holding curfew violators. If a child was found in repeated violation of the curfew, police had the authority to …ne the child's parents up to $500. Furthermore, businesses could also be …ned for allowing minors to remain on their premises during curfew hours.
In conjunction with these penalties were a series of youth programs including a person can still be hit with the curfew." (Bell, 1994) But clearly, even if the youth is not underage, curfew laws provide police with a legal justi…cation for stopping and questioning people who appear to be young. This has the potential to lead to the arrests of many more young people for serious crimes than would otherwise have been apprehended by the police.
III Methodology
Recent studies rely on variation in the date of adoption of city curfew laws to identify treatment e¤ects on criminal behavior (Males and Macallair, 1999; McDowall et al., 2000) . These studies may easily be confounded if curfew laws are enacted in response to city speci…c trends in arrests. I examine these issues using an "event study" research design capable of testing for such trends and recovering any dynamics of the impact of curfew enactment.
error term which may exhibit arbitrary dependence within city but is uncorrelated with the other right hand side variables.
The D t cy are a series of "event time"dummies that equal one when curfew enactment is t periods away in a city. Formally, we may write:
where I [:] is an indicator function for the expression in brackets being true and e c is the year a curfew is enacted in city c.
Thus, the t coe¢ cients represent the time path of arrests relative to the date of curfew enactment for cities subject to the curfew conditional on the three unobserved variance components y , c , and " cy . If curfews are randomly assigned the following restriction should hold:
In words, this condition states that curfew enactment is not, on average, preceded by trends in city speci…c arrests.
The results in this paper are obtained by estimating (1) by ordinary least squares, including a set of event time dummies along with dummies for the city and year …xed e¤ects. The reader familiar with such models will recognize that not all of the 's can be identi…ed as the D t cy 's are perfectly collinear in the presence of the city e¤ects.
For this reason I normalize 1 = 0, so that all post-enactment coe¢ cients can be 9 thought of as treatment e¤ects. I also impose the following endpoint restrictions:
which simply state that any dynamics wear o¤ after six years. 5 This restriction helps to reduce some of the collinearity between the year and event time dummies.
Because the sample is unbalanced in event time, these endpoint coe¢ cients give unequal weight to cities enacting curfews early or late in the sample. For this reason I focus the analysis on the event time coe¢ cients falling within a …ve year window which are identi…ed o¤ of a nearly balanced panel of cities. Hypothesis testing is conducted using robust standard errors clustered at the city level. 6 
IV Data
The data on curfew enactment were collected from a variety of sources. I start with the lists given in Rue ‡e and Reynolds (1996a Reynolds ( , 1996b ), who surveyed the universe of cities with a 1992 population of 100,000 or more. They queried each city's police department as to whether a youth curfew had been enacted, the hours of the curfew, whether the curfew was newly enacted or revised, and which age-groups were subject to the curfew. Comparisons of the data with city codes and newspaper stories indicated that some of the information was inaccurate. Many cities had enacted curfews prior to the dates listed in the survey and some had not enacted curfews at all. Furthermore, some of the information on which age-groups the curfew applied to was incorrect.
To deal with these data quality problems I acquired municipal codes from all 92 cities with a 1990 population greater than 180,000. 7 These codes generally contained a history of revisions and a description of exactly which age-groups were covered by the curfew ordinance. In some cases the revision history was not listed and I contacted city clerks directly to inquire about previous ordinances and prior versions of the code. To be sure that the code did not refer to a rewritten version of an old ordinance, I searched the ProQuest and Lexis-Nexis periodical indices for newspaper stories detailing the process of curfew enactment in each city for 5 years before and after each of the suspected dates of enactment. Using this information I compiled a legislative history of each city's curfew law.
After cross-referencing the legislative history, the list from Rue ‡e and Reynolds, and newspaper articles, I arrived at an estimation sample of 54 cities that began enforcing a curfew law during the sample period. 8 Table I Arrests are not a perfect measure of youth criminal behavior, since they also re ‡ect the behavior of police. However, detailed age data are not available in UCR o¤ense reports and other work indicates that arrest data provide fairly accurate representations of underlying criminal activity. 10 To deal with issues of police discretion I focus on serious felonies which are unlikely to be reclassi…ed as curfew violations.
Thus, we should expect that if curfew laws change the behavior of police, they should allow them to more easily apprehend and arrest minors below the curfew age (to the extent that such minors are capable of being distinguished from their peers), biasing estimates of the statutory treatment e¤ect up towards zero. 
V Results
As an initial check on whether the scheme for classifying curfew enactment dates described in the Appendix was succesful, I begin by examining the impact of curfew enactment on arrests for curfew and loitering violations. These data are of lower quality than those on arrests for Type I o¤enses, with roughly half of the cities in my sample reporting no such arrests in any given year. This is consistent with the UCR's hierarchical classi…cation scheme which requires that arrests for such violations that also yield evidence of more serious infractions (such as arson or burglarly) be reported as due to the more serious o¤ense. However, all municipalities eventually report at least one such arrest during the sample period. Figure I plots the estimated t coe¢ cients from a regression of the form given in (1) where the dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of arrests of youth in age-groups subject to the curfew. 11 The bands around the point estimates are 90% cluster-robust con…dence intervals. There is no pre-treatment trend in the coe¢ cients but a rather dramatic increase in arrests for curfew violations at the date of enactment which intensi…es over the following years. The sharp timing of this result suggests that the data classi…cation scheme described in the Appendix provides relatively accurate information about the timing of curfew enactment.
Turning now to the more serious criminal outcomes of interest, the panels of Figure II plot the estimated t coe¢ cients from regressions of the form given in (1) for three di¤erent age-groups: a) youth subject to the curfew, b) young adults above the curfew age but less than age 25, c) adults over age 25. The dependent variable is the log of total arrests for Part I o¤enses.
The story told by the …gures is rather striking. Prior to enactment there is no trend in the arrests of youth subject to curfew laws or adults over age 25. A slight upward trend in arrests appears to be present among young adults above the curfew age. Evidently, curfew laws are enacted in response to trends in the behavior of older teens rather than city-wide crime rates.
Though the estimates are imprecise, it appears that curfews generate large reductions in the number of arrests of youth below the curfew age. Arrests drop by nearly 15 percent in the year after enactment and then appear to revert slowly after that to a new steady state level 10% below baseline. Note from Table II be an upward pre-enactment trend, young adults above the curfew age also appear to exhibit small decreases in arrests, casting doubt on the statistical discrimination hypothesis. Small decreases also appear to be present among adults over age 25 for whom no such trend was found. These results suggest that curfews actually reduce criminal activity among adults, either due to cross-age interactions or stepped up social programming e¤orts which might accompany curfew enactment.
To remove the potential in ‡uence of social programming e¤orts like midnight basketball, Figure III reports event study coe¢ cients where the dependent variable is the log di¤erence between arrests of the oldest age-group in a city subject to the curfew law and the youngest age-group exempt from the curfew. Since these two groups di¤er in age by a single year, it is unlikely that local authorities can distinguish between them ex-ante. Hence, any impacts on their relative arrest rates ought to identify a pure statutory treatment e¤ect. Once again we see from the 
Quantitative Estimates
Although the general pattern of the …gures is clear, the individual t coe¢ cients are quite imprecise. It is useful to provide more formal tests of the null hypotheses that curfews have no e¤ect on arrests of the various age-group samples considered thus far. In order to gain statistical power I test hypotheses about averages of the t coe¢ cients over various time intervals. The results are disaggregated by crime category. Figure II . The estimated average reduction in crime due to curfew enactment in the three years starting with the year of enactment is 11%
and statistically distinguishable from zero. The average e¤ect over the six years starting with the year of enactment is also 11% and distinguishable from zero. Few discernable di¤erences in e¤ect patterns are present across the three subcategories of o¤enses. Impacts on violent crime appear to dissipate faster than other categories but the standard errors for this subcategory are quite large.
Table IV provides estimates of statutory treatment e¤ects. As in Figure III , enactment appears to be associated with declines in the relative arrests of youth just below curfew age of roughly 9% in the three years starting with the year of enactment, with similar patterns across o¤ense categories. 12 These e¤ects appear to begin to dissipate after 3 years, except for severe crimes which show no sign of a rebound.
The modest di¤erences between the statutory impacts and the overall impacts on youth suggests little role for social programming or statistical discrimination e¤ects.
Since Figure II indicates that young adults just above the curfew age and adults age 25+ respond in a similar fashion to curfew enactment I pool the two categories together in estimating spillover e¤ects on exempt age-groups. Table V provides estimated impacts on arrests of all individuals above the curfew age. The point estimates suggest curfew enactment led to a modest reduction in arrests among groups exempt from the curfew, with the strongest response present among violent crimes.
However these impacts are statistically insigni…cant. Since the point estimates are negative, however, they suggest little role for statistical discrimination e¤ects but rather the possibility of positive cross-age dependence in criminal activity. 13 As a …nal check on this interpretation of the estimated spillover e¤ects, I examine whether curfew enactment is associated with changes in the number of police o¢ cers per capita as an increase in police resources could yield reductions in crime across all age-groups even if statistical discrimination e¤ects were present. Figure 
VI Conclusion
Curfews appear to have important e¤ects on the criminal behavior of youth. The arrest data suggest that being subject to a curfew reduces the arrests of juveniles below the curfew age by approximately 10% in the …ve years following enactment.
Arrests of adults also appear to fall in response to enactment though the intensity and timing of the e¤ect appears to be similar across exempt age-groups, suggesting that statistical discrimination has little to do with any spillover e¤ects. However, the precision of the estimated e¤ects on older age-groups is poor and I cannot rule out small (and potentially important) discrimination e¤ects.
It is interesting to note that these …ndings are in keeping with the perceptions of those subject to curfew policies. As Adams (2003) notes,"Public opinion shows overwhelming support for curfews. . . the primary basis for [this] support is the conviction that curfews reduce crime and make the streets safer."Though this analysis cannot uncover the exact mechanism through which curfews a¤ect crime, the large statutory results suggest youth crime is imperfectly substitutable across time and that temporal targeting of law enforcement policies may be e¤ective.
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An alternative rationalization of the evidence is that parents play an important role in the enforcement of curfews over and above that of police. If municipal curfews act as focal points in the establishment of household policies, a curfew with modest …nes (and arrests) could lead to large changes in the behavior of youth. The potential role of parents in self-enforcement of curfews is an important area for future research.
Finally, though curfews appear to be e¤ective at reducing juvenile arrests, it is important to bear in mind that we have little data on the costs of such programs, either directly in terms of dollars spent enforcing such ordinances, or indirectly in terms of the opportunity costs of policing. Additional evidence on these issues is necessary to inform policy decisions. Adams (2003) for reviews of the literature. 13 An alternative interpretation of the spillover e¤ects, suggested by a referee, is that curfews, by deterring youth from illegal activity, may free o¢ cers to more actively police adults, thereby generating a reduction in adult criminal activity.
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Appendix: Data Construction
The data on curfew implementation were constructed from a variety of sources with the aim of addressing three primary sets of concerns. The …rst concern was that the assigned dates of curfew enactment would be too late, having been preceded by another enactment a few years prior. Such errors should not only add to the noise of the estimated treatment e¤ects, but bias them towards zero while biasing pre-treatment trends away from zero. For this reason I created a detailed legislative paper trail for the curfew policies in each city and an algorithm for categorizing what had been found. The second concern was that the age-groups to which the curfew were to apply might be wrong or might have changed over time. I went to great lengths to make sure that the age-groups being compared actually received di¤erent treatments, searching legislation and newspaper stories for signs of a change.
Again, errors in the assignment should yield treatment e¤ects biased towards zero.
Finally, I was concerned that in some cases the passing of curfew ordinances might not be associated with enforcement. There is no perfect way to measure enforcement and I settled upon a simple expedient which was to interpret certain disagreements between the municipal code and survey responses to questions regarding the presence of curfew laws as evidence of lax enforcement.
Sample Selection and Dates of Enactment
Several sources of information were used to assign dates of curfew enactment to cities.
The …rst is a 1996 survey of police departments with a 1992 population over 100,000
performed by Rue ‡e and Reynolds (R&R). R&R called every such police department inquiring if a curfew law was in place, when the curfew was originally enacted, and when, if ever, it had been revised or re-enacted. While R&R's survey is most likely a good measure of which cities had curfews in 1996, its reliability as a measure of when, prior to 1996, a city's curfews were in e¤ect is unknown. 14 Police departments have a limited institutional memory and it is unclear how they interpreted questions about the date that a city's curfew was "originally"enacted. 15 To complement the data found in R&R, I obtained a current copy of the municipal code for every city with a 1990 population over 180,000. These municipal codes generally contain the initial date of enactment and dates of revision of the sections relating to the curfew. However, in some cases portions of the code have been totally repealed only to be replaced by similar language. In such cases the "initial"date of searched newspaper articles and city codes for mention of a curfew law. I found that four of these cities had passed curfews although two of those came after the time of R&R's survey. The two cities with curfews enacted after 1996 were included in the sample of enacters, while the remaining two were dropped under the assumption that a failure to report a curfew to R&R signaled a lack of enforcement. For cities that were listed in R&R as enacting a curfew during the sample period, I used the following rule to assign enactment dates. If the city code listed a date in the sample period that was identical or prior to R&R I used the earliest such date.
If the R&R date was prior to the earliest code date in the sample period, I called the city clerk to search for earlier ordinances. In most cases I was able to …nd prior 27 ordinances with enactment dates identical or prior to those found in R&R. Of the 55 cities that R&R listed as enacting curfews during the sample period, the assignment rule yielded a date that agreed with R&R in 40 cases. Of the 15 remaining cases 12 yielded enactment dates prior to those found in R&R while the remaining 3 had enactment dates after those found in R&R.
Inspection of newspaper articles indicated that 3 cities (Baltimore, Miami, and Dallas) had injunctions issued against their curfew ordinances preventing them from being enforced at the time of enactment. All of these cities eventually won their court battles and thus I changed the date of enactment to re ‡ect the post-injunction date of enforcement. A fourth city, the District of Columbia, also faced an injunction against its curfew ordinance, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the courts.
Since DC attempted to enact curfew laws several times, each time su¤ering a defeat in court, I drop it from the sample.
Finally, two cities had exceptional circumstances that warranted dropping them from the sample. The …rst, Hialeah, according to the city attorney, never enforced a curfew, but was forced to legally adopt one as part of a measure passed by Dade
County. The second, Las Vegas, was dropped because its only curfew enacted during the sample period applied to "high school students"without specifying a particular age range and only covered a narrow geographic area.
The …nal sample contained 54 cities enacting curfews (55 enacters -3 exceptions + 2 enacters not listed in R&R). For each city, I rounded the date of enactment to the next year if the curfew was enacted in December or November. 17 The following 28 
Maximum Curfew Age
In all cases the maximum statutory curfew age was taken from the city code or relevant ordinance. Among the 54 cities listed in R&R as enacting curfews during the sample period, 46 had information identical to that found in their city code/ordinances. Two of the eight cities with di¤erent age information had different enactment dates. The remaining six discrepancies appear to be mistakes on the part of R&R. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the city level. Short run effects refer to the average of the coefficients in periods t=0,1, and 2. Long run effects refer to the average of the coefficients in periods t=3,4, and 5. Average effect refers to the average of coefficients in periods 0 through 5.
Estimates taken from specification of form given in equation (1) with dependent variable log of arrests of youth in age-groups subject to curfew.
Severe Violent Crimes Numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the city level. Short run effects refer to the average of the coefficients in periods t=0,1, and 2. Long run effects refer to the average of the coefficients in periods t=3,4, and 5. Average effect refers to the average of coefficients in periods 0 through 5.
Estimates taken from specification of form given in equation (1) with dependent variable log ratio of arrests of youth with single digit age equal to statutory curfew age to youth one year above curfew age.
Severe Violent Crimes
Estimates taken from specification of form given in equation (1) with dependent variable log of arrests of adults age 35+. 
